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Abstract 
This article considers the dynamic relationship between the soldier, the army, and the 
warzone, using contemporary philosophy and military theory to frame a reading of 
Roman sources. I will discuss how Roman literature reveals geographic space to be 
transformed by military activity; likewise, how this space and the soldier’s 
functioning in it synchronously makes the soldier’s body military, specifically, Roman 
military. The aim is to utilise examples from ancient warfare to reflect on issues of de- 
and reterritorialisation, in modern critical military studies. I will explore how the 
soldierly body both constructs and is constructed by the space in which it moves.  
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Introduction 
The ancient Roman army is linguistically associated with movement. In Latin literature, 
Roman legionaries are frequently connoted by a host of synonymic terms which imply 
movement of some kind, such as cursus, ‘a rushing’ (see Nepos, Miltiades, 1.6), and agmen, 
‘a procession, march’, or literally, ‘that which is driven’ (Tacitus, Histories, 1.68). Military 
terminology still today evokes the constant movement and nomadism characteristic of 
military life – inherent in the term, the ‘mobilised’ army – a nomadism which is nonetheless 
integral to the maintenance of fixed territory.  
This article aims to show how ancient texts describing the movement of the Roman 
army, particularly the armies of the Republican period (509-45 BC), can provide a 
provocative case study for the idea that military activity functions to de- and reterritorialise 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2013, translated by Massumi) the spaces in and through which it is 
mobile. As Matthew Rech and his collaborators make clear in their contribution to Critical 
Military Studies’ first volume, the theorising of geographical space and its occupation ‘has 
always been intimately associated with the practice of armed conflict, the deployment of 
armed forces, and the maintenance of military capabilities’ (Rech et al. 2015, 48).1 The 
theoretical groundwork for the notion that military movement affects the space, the territory, 
within and through which it moves will be explored and expounded throughout this article, as 
it is used to read examples from ancient historiography, poetry, and texts deemed tactical or 
strategic. The theories and practices revealed in these ancient texts offer a new perspective on 
the territorialising function of the military. In the application of such theoretical assessment to 
ancient warfare, I will experientially explore the similarities evident in phenomena 
recognisable to modern readers but in an ancient context, revealing consistencies and 
contrasts between modern warfare and one of the greatest military forces in the history of 
Western civilisation.  
In response to the broad history of military geographies being focused largely on 
material culture and the development of weaponry (Black 2005, 19), this article looks instead 
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at the construction of military territory as a result of corporeal practices. The Roman empire’s 
rapid expansion was, of course, made possible by a fluctuating body of men’s bodies, revered 
as the most ruthless military force in the ancient world (Sage 2008, 267; Alston 2010, 208; 
Cicero, On the Republic, 3.35-7). Therefore, a consideration of Roman, as much as modern, 
military geography ought to include environmental, technological and corporeal factors.  
The first part of the article will discuss the effect of military mobilisation in 
geographical environments: the kind of social, cultural and political landscapes which garner 
prevalent theoretical analysis in modern critical military studies (Woodward 2014; Flint 
2005; Higate and Henry 2010), but to a lesser extent in ancient history scholarship (Nicolet 
1994; Pomeroy 2003; Riess and Fagan 2017). This first section will therefore demonstrate 
and encourage a theoretical and critical approach to ancient military praxes, in light of 
modern theory. The second part of the article will progress this discussion by focusing on the 
idea that military movement is conducted by bodies. In this way, this article contributes to the 
fields of both Classics and critical military studies a new theoretical approach to the Roman 
army, furthering the study of how geographical space is territorialised by also encompassing 
the discrete space of the soldier’s body in this territorialising process, with the proposition 
that the body is similarly territorialised by military praxes. This latter part of the discussion is 
theoretically influenced by modern (late twentieth- and twenty-first century) philosophers, 
social anthropologists, and military theorists, with the aim of demonstrating how counterpart 
phenomena in the ancient world can instigate reflection on modern attitudes and practices.  
Many scholars adopting a theoretical approach to the military have used examples 
from ancient history as a foreground for discussing affairs contemporary to them (cf. 
Agamben 2016; Foucault 1997; Lefebvre 2009), not least because of the oftentimes palpable 
causal relations or similarities in practices and ideologies. Moreover, Classicists and ancient 
historians sometimes have little choice but to use the theory of their contemporaries to frame 
the discussion of ancient culture (Cosmopoulos 2007).2 While this article does not argue that 
ancient Roman war-makers and historiographers adopted modern tactics and perspectives, 
nevertheless, the overlapping of two historical periods can prove a fruitful thinking exercise 
for reflecting on the impetus, methods and fallout of military mobilisation, transhistorically.  
 The Roman army, particularly that of the Republic, makes for a pertinent case to be 
brought to the attention of today’s critical military scholars, owing to their renowned brutal 
efficiency in conquering territory. The ubiquitous description of the Roman armed forces as a 
‘machine’ (Peddie 1994, Nicolet 1980, 90, compare Mattern 2009, 127) should not be readily 
dismissed as cliché: during the Republican period alone, the territorial space of the Roman 
state expanded from a tiny portion of the Italian peninsula to roughly five million square 
kilometres across Europe and North Africa (van Tilburg 2007, 1-11; Nicolet 1994, 1). 
Paradigmatically, describes Christophe Coker (2002, 39), ‘Roman warfare usually evokes the 
metaphor of a machine, Greek warfare a duel’, here referring to the discipline of the Roman 
legion, ‘waging war with machinelike precision’ (Ward 2017, 300). In parallel, the modern 
armed forces are routinely dubbed a ‘machine’ in military criticism (MacLeish 2015), in this 
sense conveying how these forces operate uniformly to overthrow the governing power 
previously assigned to a landscape.3 In either case, this catalytic force also invests any 
‘militarised’ landscape with a new dominating power and, hence, alters its socio-political 
identity. In ‘Security, Territory, and Population’, Michel Foucault describes the army as a 
primary governmental ‘apparatus’ of ‘diplomatico-military technology’ (1997, 69, translated 
by Hurley; also Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 493-7) for the expansion and maintenance of the 
state.4 The ‘state’ here includes geographical territory, and all it comprises, governed by a 
centralised political system. The review of Roman sources in this article therefore has at its 
philosophical heart this perception of the army as a state operated, territorialising machine – a 
force mobilised for the safeguarding of sovereignty and the continuance of government 
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power.   
 This theoretical focus will be used to frame ancient literary sources and their modern 
reception, as these primary texts present the most comprehensive evidence for Roman 
warfare practices, attitudes and experiences, accessible to ancient historians. Given the 
centrality of organised conflict in Roman society, there are numerous extant texts from the 
ancient world describing this military success, many written by those who had seen battle 
themselves. These are mostly historiographic prose, such as Julius Caesar’s accounts of his 
campaigns in Gaul and the civil wars (58-45 BC, Lovano 2013, 75: ‘a sort of field report to 
the people of Rome, informing them of what happened “out there”’), or the Greek historian, 
Polybius’, Roman Histories, written at the close of the Punic Wars against Carthage (264-146 
BC) in the mid-Republic. For the most part infused with a perceptible Roman bias, these texts 
concern themselves largely with tactical manoeuvres and outcomes, but also offer insight into 
the somatic and psychological experiences of conflict, in the reports of soldiers’ behaviour 
and the decisions of their generals. However, texts which synthesise notional strategy and 
military theory are comparatively rare; Vegetius’ Epitome of Military Science, from the 
fourth century AD, is the only intact extant text specifically dedicated to training and method.5 
Ancient historians are primarily reliant on these tactical and historiographical texts because, 
unlike in modern military scholarship, first-hand reports of battle from those Roman foot-
soldiers (not the higher-ranking centurions or generals) actually mobilised to fight are 
virtually non-existent.6   
Instead, a more expressive and individualistic portrait of military life is offered by 
epigraphic or poetic texts, more speculative in nature. The philosophical and rhetorical 
writings of Cicero (106-43 BC) provide a prolific source of commentary on the political and 
civil strife in the Republic’s final decades, also the politician, Sallust’s, War of Catiline (63 
BC) and the retrospective Jugurthine War (41 BC). For the purpose of this article, those works 
at the checkpoint between fiction and history prove most useful, if considered as a reflection 
of social, cultural and artistic perspectives on warfare in the Roman world: Livy’s vast Latin 
epic, History of Rome (27 BC to 17 AD), for example, is the only source of information for 
many key (if debatable) moments in the Republican timeline (although three-quarters of it 
has survived only through a posthumous abridgement, the Periochae). Select historical and 
poetic works which retrospectively describe events of the Republic are similarly worth 
including, such as the unfinished Civil War (65 AD), by first century AD poet, Lucan, a violent 
and subversive narrative of the civil conflict leading to Caesar’s triumph. Detailed chronicles 
of prominent generals and their campaigns were compiled by Suetonius (121 AD), Cassius 
Dio (211-33 AD), and the Greek historian, Plutarch (c. 100 AD), albeit two or three centuries 
after their subjects’ lives. This article will therefore engage with a range of texts in these 
categories, to form a representation of military life and its criticality in ancient Rome.  
For, until the reforms passed in 108 BC, military service was obligatory for 
Republican Romans and directly connected to politics and the attainment of a public office 
(Nicolet 1980, 91-2), with the average length of duty varying between six to twenty-five 
years. ‘All [Roman] citizens must serve ten years in the cavalry or twenty years in the 
infantry before the forty-sixth year of their age’, writes Polybius (6.19, translated by 
Shuckburgh), in the mid-second century BC. This close link between citizen and martial life 
has led many historians to describe the Republican army as ‘a citizens militia’ (Patterson 
1993, 95), as though these two parts were indivisible: ‘like all ancient cities, but perhaps to a 
greater extent than any other, Rome was a community of warriors’, writes Claude Nicolet 
(1980, 89, translated by Falla).  
The description of a ‘community of warriors’, in The World of the Citizen in 
Republican Rome, suggests a troubling of the citizen-space as also a military-space (although 
not explicitly articulated by Nicolet), a troubling which seemingly parallels the function of 
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the Roman military in simultaneously disrupting or creating other community spaces, in order 
to construct a peaceful empire. The scholarship, on the whole, eschews analysing this 
destruction-creation in theoretical terms not immediately practical, political or strategic. Yet, 
a philosophical approach to Roman expansion allows for a reconsideration of what ‘empire’ 
and ‘territory’ really signify, in terms of land, people and, crucially, movement. Roman 
territory can refer not only to trampled earth, but to any space affecting or affected by action, 
a definition readily applicable to the discussion of other modes of power, past and present. 
The territorialising function of military praxes is widely recognised tangentially, and 
sometimes explicitly, in modern military criticism, as evidenced by Rachel Woodward’s 
seminal Military Geographies (2004; see also Woodward 2014), and Deborah Cowen and 
Emily Gilbert’s War, Citizenship and Territory (2008).7 Therefore, through a theoretical 
engagement with ancient source material, this article will explore how we can 
reconceptualise the military’s destruction-creation of terrestrial spaces, by also discussing the 
‘territorialisation’ of the Roman soldierly corpus. In sum, this article contends that the 
activity of being-Roman-army exemplarily makes manifest philosophies of territorialisation, 
in terms of the dynamic interrelation between movement, space and identity.  
 
Ager Romanus 
It is the mobilisation of the army that expands (through warfare) and maintains (through 
peacekeeping) political territory (Foucault 1991, 167-8). In the field of critical military 
studies which concerns itself with military geography, there is a prevailing sense that whether 
in battle or during peacetime the military has a profound effect on environments and their 
constituents. ‘For millennia,’ write Cowen and Gilbert (2008, 1), ‘conflicts over the control 
of people and places have reshaped the organisation of collective human life. War kills, 
starves, displaces and destroys.’ Woodward’s (2007, 2-3) ‘military geographies’ are 
environments without even the eruption of battle, where ‘militarism and military activities 
create spaces, places, environments and landscapes with reference to a distinct moral order’. 
That land under military control, in peacetime, in preparation for war, or for the maintenance 
of foreign control of sovereign territory (Woodward 2007, 17-20; Rech, et al. 2015), is a 
space radically transformed by immediate or adjacent military presence, into ground for 
training or peacekeeping (Higate and Henry 2010, 44).   
 This article expands on this field of study by reading the creation-destruction of 
landscapes by any military activity as an exemplary practice of territorialisation, by the very 
nature of its imperialistic or defensive purpose. For, a discussion framed by the philosophy of 
territorialisation allows for an overlap of two major strands in military criticism, both 
historical and modern: these strands concern the effect of military activity on landscape, and 
on the soldierly body.  
 Territorialisation, as a concept, broadens the signification of the terms, ‘spaces’ and 
‘territories’, to include how actions reciprocally alter subjects as well as objects, and that 
actions and actors are not inseparable from their environment. The close relation in Latin 
vocabulary between words meaning ‘army’, and the actions performed in military space 
(cursus, agmen), need not necessarily be interpreted as merely economical linguistics, but as 
symbolic of the (Roman) soldier’s identity being fundamentally linked to movement and 
territory. Resultantly, ideas concerning the reflexive impact of military geography on human 
beings, latent in the work of Woodward, and Gilbert and Cowen, can be teased out more 
explicitly through engagement with the philosophy of territorialisation in the context of an 
expanding empire, an expansion which simultaneously created both the territory and the 
subjects of Roman domain. 
Foucault, and his contemporaries, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, conjecture 
‘territory’ to mean far more than landscape or architecture, or even political dominion, but a 
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matter of forces and movements, interconnected with political power and cultural space. In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, their seminal attack on psychoanalysis and 
capitalism, the processes of ‘de-’ and ‘reterritorialisation’ (2013, 36, translated by Massumi) 
designate how certain forces – physical, ideological, cultural, political – destabilise codes, 
desires and identities relating to spaces (deterritorialisation), and overlay them with alternates 
(reterritorialisation). These forces function through movement. Spaces-as-territories are 
affected and produced by actions and intentions, as well as presence: by flows of people, 
trade, and ideas; those territories affected might be a whole continent, a city, a dwelling, or an 
individual body (Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 9, 102, 375-6, 502-4; also Deleuze and Guattari 
2012, 213-23).  
A simple metaphor for conceptualising the territorialisation process, provided by 
Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus, is ‘bird song: the bird sings to mark its 
territory’ (2013, 366, translated by Massumi). The nonviolent musical refrain of the bird 
nevertheless invades the space of its present habitation with the territorial marker of that bird, 
rendering it ‘the bird’s territory’. For Deleuze and Guattari, and in the wider appropriation of 
these conceits, territorialising forces often manifest themselves immanently in codes and 
behaviours, such as language, customs and instincts (2013, 366). Like the territorialising 
effect of the dawn chorus, the repeated ritual of these behaviours sustains territorial coding.  
Socio-cultural-political territories are not wholly defined by the static components 
which construct their geographical area, but by the actions and functions of their inhabitants 
(or their invaders), who conduct processes of territorialisation. Henri Lefebvre’s influential 
The Production of Space provides an extensive exploration of this framework, with repeated 
references to the conception of space in the Greco-Roman world (2009, 31, 229-45). 
Lefebvre proposes that movement, activity and associated ideas define spaces and locations: 
‘Everyone knows what is meant when we speak of a “room” in an apartment, the “corner” of 
the street, a “marketplace”, a public “place”, and so on” (2009, translated by Nicholson-
Smith, 16; see also Hubbard, Kitchin and Valentine 2004, 5). In this branch of discourse, 
understandings of space and territory denote not specific physical sites, but crucibles of 
activity. Every society produces and gives meaning to its own space (Lefebvre 2009, 31; 
Woodward 2004, 124).  
Further, Livio Boni (2011, 55) describes how in the politically-charged philosophy of 
Deleuze and Guattari, and Foucault (with reference to ‘Security, Territory, and Population’), 
the city-space is not purely architectural, but ‘una certa densità degli apparati’ [a certain 
density of apparatuses]. The city is conceived of as an aggregate of social and political 
machines, which territorialise the space through their functioning and their movement, which 
creates meaning. The sociologist, Deepak Mehta (2006, 209), writes on this phenomenon 
with regard to violence and community in cities and neighbourhoods:  
 
An urban neighbourhood may be laid out according to a street plan, but it is not a 
space until it is marked by people’s active participation, their movements through and 
around it. But, by the same reasoning, such spaces can also lead to an extraordinary 
exclusion.  
 
The ‘exclusion’ to which Mehta refers is the non-practicing of certain customs, which results 
in a symbolic, cultural, non-habitation of that same space. The meanings connected to the 
territory of that space are maintained by the complementary functioning of the spatial 
(territorial) populace.8 Boundaries are subsequently easily definable in terms of the practice 
or non-practice of accepted behaviours and customs (see MacLeish 2016, 6). Such an 
understanding of the social space can prove essential for thinking about the territorialising 
function of the mobilised army – the state’s most physically and symbolically potent political 
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machine (see Pearson, et al. 2010, 8).   
 The space of the city or state is resultantly viewed as a spatial region defined by the 
behaviours which territorialise it as belonging to a certain nation or tribe. The city of Rome is 
well worth considering in this regard. In both recent scholarship and Roman sources, 
emphasis is placed on the ‘meaning’ of the ancient metropolis, for its inhabitants and 
observers, as existing somewhere between its material, historical and metaphysical layers 
(Edwards 1996; Nicolet 1994; Martial, Epigrams, 12.57). Indeed, the understanding of 
‘territory’, discussed above, is reflected in the Latin word, ager, as in the ager Romanus 
(Roman land), those five million square kilometres which made the Romans the ruling power 
in the Mediterranean.9 Ager not only translates as ‘land’, ‘the soil belonging to a community’ 
(see Cicero, On Agriculture, 3.2), but specifically ‘territory’, ‘domain’ (see Livy, 2.16). 
During the Republic, the sprawling ager Romanus was without fixed boundaries (in contrast 
to Gallic territory, see Caesar, Gallic Wars, 1.2.3), in which ‘Romans might subject territory 
to direct rule without clearly defining a province or even achieving a complete pacification’ 
(Lintott 1993, 31).10 The lack of distinct boundary lines, here intimated, suggests that Roman 
authority did not rely merely on geographical markers and, resultantly, invites us to question 
the extent to which these boundaries were limited to territory underfoot (see Mattern 2009, 
128). 
A more stable proposition is seemingly that ‘Roman’ citizenship, Roman land, and 
Roman identity, from its inception, was fundamentally related to the coding and 
territorialising function of military activity. In a practical sense, notes Nicolet (1994, 64-5), 
military campaigns in the late-Republic critically improved the Romans’ knowledge of 
European geography (see Polybius, 3.59; Strabo, 3.4.19), particularly in the West. Roman 
roads, interconnecting populaces across the empire, were built by the army, a point singled 
out by Lefebvre (2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 245) as an example of ‘spatial 
practice’ used to demonstrate political power: ‘the Roman road, whether civil or military, 
links the urbs to the countryside over which it exercises dominion.’  
Transhistorically, ‘War has been a watershed for citizenship,’ write Cowen and 
Gilbert (2008, 2), of which the Roman Republic is archetypal. Along those famously direct 
roads, the army marched into provincial terrain as ‘the torchbearers of civilisation’ (Watson 
1983, 144; Vegetius, 3) – by which ‘civilisation’ meant Roman culture, ideology, and 
customs, and ‘torchbearers’ meant mass slaughter and pillaging (Goldsworthy 2013, 164); 
‘birdsong’ of the most violent strain. Roman campaigns effected rapid domination and, 
importantly, the destruction of lives and ways of life: the ager Romanus can be read as a 
territory exemplarily reflective of military mobilisation as state power and influence.11  
Like a virus infiltrating foreign (or national) terrain, the ancient or modern military 
body functions to alter or inhibit action within physical landscapes, by introducing the 
potentiality of violence-production and a new governmental power, disturbing the 
environment of the host population (Woodward 2007, 89). Vivid accounts of the Roman 
military’s impact on invaded spaces are offered in Greco-Roman historiographic and poetic 
literature. Whilst manifold ancient narratives seem, at face value, broadly devoted to the 
national or political glorification of ‘successful’ conflict (for instance, the transformation of 
Latium into Rome after six books of battle scenes in Virgil’s epic, Aeneid), certain ancient 
writers adopted an adversative attitude, subversively or explicitly, by graphically illustrating 
the ‘environment of alienation and despair’ (Chrissanthos 2007, 235) and the ‘sorrow and 
horror’ of Roman warfare (Bartsch 1997, 36, on Lucan). These texts resultantly convey the 
army as demonstrative of de- and reterritorialisation, in modes which realise some of the 
graver theoretical conceits latent in this philosophy, and in critical military scholarship, more 
plainly than it is comfortable to consider for a civilisation so influential to Western culture.  
The Roman Histories of the Greek historian, Polybius, portray the especial infamy of 
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the Roman military force during the long struggle between Rome and the relentless threat of 
Carthage (264-146 BC; see also Livy, 21-30).12 As a victim of Roman imperialism, himself, 
Polybius’ writings are a rich source of information about the second century BC Roman 
military.13 Namely, writes Charles Lintott (1993, 22), ‘Polybius correctly understood the 
Roman aim in their greatest bout of imperial expansion as one of exacting obedience, 
compelling other peoples to obey orders.’ For instance, in Polybius’ account of the invasion 
of New Carthage (209 BC), he posits that the Roman legions were ordered to kill every person 
in the city, ‘to inspire terror, so that when towns are taken by the Romans one may often see 
not only the corpses of humans, but dogs cut in half, and the dismembered limbs of other 
animals’ (Histories, 10.15, translated by Shuckburgh). Polybius’ account reveals a 
microcosm of the ager Romanus in its imperialistic, territorialising capacity: the ransacking 
and mass slaughter described here exemplifies the transformation of territory, by robbing the 
inhabitants of their control, customs and even the unity of their bodies.14 This horrifying 
narrative demonstrates how the presence of the Roman army de- and reterritorialised not only 
the political governance of the land, but ‘inspired terror’ which mushroomed from its source. 
The devastation of New Carthage serves as spatial evidence of Roman imperialism and an 
unwillingness to suffer sovereign threat.  
Roman de- and reterritorialisation was not always so dramatically and devastatingly 
actioned, but can be read in less immediately political, yet still transformative, praxes. In 
order to achieve such an immense overcoding of geographical territory during Republican 
annexation, nearly a quarter of the Roman male population served as soldiers at any one time 
(Erdkamp 2006, 293). To sustain this force required around one-hundred tonnes of wheat per 
day and herds of pack animals, which marched with the legions (Beard 2015, 177; Livy, 
26.8.10-11; Sallust, Jugurthan War, 46.7, 90.2; Strabo, 4.5.2). The Republican military did 
not have fixed bases, but were a ‘field’, ‘mobile’ army (Goldsworthy 2013, 82). As a result, 
the army not only actioned political occupations, but physically changed the landscape to 
reflect its new possession, rendering it a militarised territory for their own nomadic 
sustenance. Military occupation then, as today, involved a tangible mutation of terrain, ‘a 
process that requires the active deployment and exploitation of various landscape features, 
including topography, vegetation and climate’ (Pearson, et al. 2010, 3). As in modern military 
criticism, the consequences of such creative-destructive activity on campaign led Roman 
historians such as Sallust to condemn the resourceful reterritorialisation of the earth: ‘And so 
those soldiers, after they attained victory, left nothing for the defeated’ (War of Catiline, 11.7, 
translated by Batstone; see also Polybius, 10.16), Sallust remarks in his damning account of 
the invasion of Carthage. 
The process of deterritorialisation could be analogised in a more extreme form in the 
policy of ‘scorched-earth’ (Latin: vastatio, ‘laying waste’, see Cicero, Catiline, 2.8.18; also 
Tacitus, Annals, 13.40-1), infamously associated with Roman warfare, and yet in many cases 
a geographical violence for which the Roman army were not directly accountable. Adopted 
by the Gauls, a race where the military had a similar cultural centrality, during Caesar’s 
campaigns of expansion and suppression of Gallic territory in the 50s BC, the ‘scorched-earth’ 
policy happened as a kind of contagion effect of Roman military presence. In his memoirs, 
straight from the command tent, Caesar (Gallic Wars, 1.5.2-3, translated in Sabben-Clare 
1971) includes description of the Helvetii tribe’s determination to migrate from their region 
in present-day Switzerland, to southwestern Gaul, following news of the Roman invasion: 
 
When [the Helvetii] thought they were ready for the enterprise, they set fire to their 
towns, twelve in all, as many as four hundred villages and the rest of their private 
buildings. They burned all corn except what they intended to take with them so that, 




The Helvetii decimated – deterritorialised – their own dwellings and landscape, leaving it a 
dead and useless space for Roman reterritorialisation. Unlike many of the invaded 
communities, who adopted Roman customs and established trade relations with their 
conquerors (Goldsworthy 2013, 105; Bowman 1994, 61), the Helvetii disallowed the 
appropriation of Gallic citizens or resources by a new sovereign power. They not only 
removed Helvetian identity from the land, but rendered it utterly and indefinitely 
uninhabitable (Caesar, Gallic Wars, 1.10-15). Moreover, they prevented any possibility of 
their migration being stalled (Gilliver 2003, 26); it is this latter, practical motive that seems to 
frame Caesar’s account, rather than any detriment suffered by the Roman opposition.15  
 While the Carthaginian wars were arguably a defensive retaliation against foreign 
threat, Caesar’s campaigns across Europe and the civil wars, in the first century BC, cannot 
easily be described as such. In fact, Cicero, a contemporary of Caesar, condemns the 
general’s attitude to warfare as a turning point for Roman expansionism, stating, ‘It always 
used to be the policy of our generals to keep these peoples at bay and avoid aggression… But 
Caesar’s policy has, I observe, been quite different […] he wanted the whole of Gaul forced 
to recognise our sovereignty’ (On the Consular Provinces, 32, translated in Sabben-Clare 
1971). Cicero here makes clear the displacement of one state stratification for another, within 
the geo-political boundaries of (former) Gallic territory. The Gauls’ strategy of retaliation 
seems clear: prevent the land from being reterritorialised as Roman.  
 However, during the civil conflict between Caesar and the Republican forces, led by 
Pompey (49-45 BC), much of the territory was already Roman, and what was at stake was the 
retention of Republican identity, rather than the uncertainty of Caesarian reterritorialisation. 
The very nature of civil war is one which still ‘introduces uncertainty, alters expectations’ 
(Kalyvas 2006, 38), and consequently affects the behaviours of the populace, as much as the 
earth they inhabit. The turbulence and anxiety induced by civil conflict underpin a later work, 
Lucan’s Civil War: as a poet, Lucan uses history in the capacity of ‘inspiration’ rather than 
groundwork (Martindale 1993, 19), but he nevertheless paints a picture of Roman military 
mobilisation comparable to that of Polybius and Caesar.16 Lucan (1.236-46, translated by 
Duff) describes the arrival of Caesar’s army at Ariminum, adjacent to the Rubicon river in 
north Italy:  
  
When the soldiers halted in the captured forum and were bidden to lay down their 
standards, the blare of trumpets […] sounded the alarm of civil war. […] But when [the 
citizens] recognised the glitter of the Roman eagles and standards and saw Caesar 
mounted in the midst of his army, they stood motionless with fear. 
 
The invading force, marching and blaring its war trumpets, here create a visual and aural 
cacophony – a birdsong – of conflict. The army reject the codes of this territory. By refusing 
the citizens’ command to ‘lay down their standards’, the Caesarian army asserted its presence 
with the signifying eagles of their legion, a move which symbolically mimics the physical 
razing of a foreign city. Barely a line is dedicated to the ease of this capture in Caesar’s 
commentaries (Civil War, 1.8), but the nature of Lucan’s text as poetry allows for a rather 
theatrical presentation of military territorialisation, by including the fear of the occupied 
inhabitants, rendering them ‘motionless’, deterritorialised of their subjectivity and agency. 
Unlike the Helvetii, the citizens of Ariminum are here deprived of their agency by the sudden 
presence of something unknown. It is as though they are afraid or unable to move until the 
determination of their territory is resolved. In this way, Lucan’s description of Caesar’s 
march on Ariminum (and Caesar’s invasion of Rome, Lucan, 3.71-168) portrays the 
reterritorialising effect of military mobilisation on citizen landscape through both the 
9 
 
behaviour of its invaders and inhabitants.17  
Military presence disrupts spaces that were formerly rural or civic with the potential 
of becoming a base or battleground (Woodward 2004; Pearson, et al. 2010, 10), a potential 
manifested in modes geographical and human. As Ariminum was already comprised by the 
ager Romanus, the hostile appearance of recognisably Roman troops made clear that this was 
civil war. For this reason, the Roman army was not permitted to amass within the pomerium, 
the city walls (Patterson 1993, 95; Erdkamp 2006, 281), because a mobilised military 
presence would immediately deterritorialise an otherwise sacred (unarmed) citizen space. 
These varied narratives from the Roman world therefore provide examples of the 
metamorphosis brought about by military action, as a direct, and redolently Weberian, impact 
on geographical and socio-political territory ‘by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be 
legitimate) violence’ (Weber 1946, 78, translated by Gerth and Wright Mills), in order to 
expand and exhibit state power. The devastation of armoured territorialisation was not lost on 
Roman writers like Lucan, Cicero, or Sallust, the latter of whom emphasised the negative 
effects of ‘good fortune’ in war: ‘when this contagion invaded like a plague, the state 
changed, and political power which had been most just and best became cruel and 
intolerable’ (Cat. 10.1-6, translated by Batstone).   
 
Barbarians 
‘The character and presence of the army,’ suggests Alan Bowman (1994, 20), on the Roman 
conquest of Britain, ‘are central to everything implied by the concept of romanisation.’ 
Throughout the expansionist campaigns of the Republic, the ‘plague’ of Rome was spread 
across the Mediterranean by the mobilisation of her troops.18 As those sources included so far 
have shown, the territorialising effect of this mobilisation was not limited to geographical 
terrain, but affected the six million inhabitants of its conquered territories.19 These human 
constituents reacted, resisted, but most commonly surrendered to military presence, 
themselves making manifest the re-stratification of land, and it is this performative aspect of 
territorialisation which makes clear how the process affects both the territorialised and the 
territorialiser. 
In the latter part of this article, rather than analysing the army’s movement in larger 
strategic or economic terms, discussion will focus instead on the discrete, individuated 
actions which aided and abetted this territorialising process. The conceptualisation and 
function of the human body as perpetrator of war dominates an extensive branch of modern 
military criticism, particularly the work of Kenneth MacLeish (2016, 5; see also MacLeish 
2012; Scarry 1985; Rech, et al. 2015, 55): ‘The soldier is at once the agent, instrument, and 
object of state violence. He or she is coerced and empowered by discipline, made productive 
by being subject to countless minute and technical compulsions,’ referring to Foucault’s 
Discipline and Punish. Neither was the importance of the body’s movement lost on the 
Romans (Vegetius, 1.1, 18, 28), nor the process by which movement appropriate for the 
military environment was cultivated. When Woodward writes, ‘Military landscapes are 
places where the identities of soldiers are forged; these identities, what it means to be a 
soldier [...] are not innate but rather are made’ (Woodward, 118), she intimates that the 
‘making’ of these identities is bound up with the ‘making’ of territory. Roman historians and 
biographers, Caesar prominent among them, asserted that war ‘makes people great’ (Lovano 
2013, 75). It is this dynamic relationship between military landscape and body which will 
now be explored, by paralleling the territorialising effects of Roman military mobilisation on 
environment with the effects on the soldierly body, which, as MacLeish suggests, is just as 
much an ‘object of state violence’, as its agent.  
The success of the Roman state in its expansion might at least partly be attributed to 
the dogma of military might and conquest which pervaded Roman culture, namely, the 
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collective normalisation of military violence as the means to both citizenship and masculinity 
(Alston 2010, 205; Chidwick 2017). Young Roman males were raised surrounded by 
reminders of their ancestors’ victories, which ideologically prepared them for entry into 
military service at seventeen (Keith 2000, 19; McDonnell 2006, 177-8). It could be argued 
that simply by participating in the structural, performative codes of the Roman socio-political 
terrain, Romans were by nature also soldiers (an identity they were arguably forced to adopt 
during the civil wars; Roller 1996). Various accounts suggest that in the second century BC 
more than half of Roman citizens served for at least seven years in the army and, as the 
empire expanded, war became a profession upon which hinged the stability of the state 
(Coker 2002, 39-40).  
However, like Western armed forces today, the Roman army comprised recruits 
drawn from all corners of Roman domain, who marched, killed and died for a sovereign city-
space inside which they may never have physically set foot. In this way, the army’s 
reputation cannot be credited to bloodline or national identity in a conventional sense, for the 
geographical terrain on which the young recruit had been born and raised did not in itself 
matter, only whether that land had been trodden by the consul’s legionaries (indeed, many 
who fought for Caesar during the civil wars were recruited from colonised Gallic territory; 
Erdkamp 2006, 294). The only requirement to join the Roman army was citizenship, which 
was extended to a large number of the lands subsumed by the banner ager Romanus (Ando 
2016), with non-citizens still permitted to join the auxiliary forces.20 This diversity was 
especially predominant after the reforms of 108 BC, which removed the property qualification 
for enlistment, and made military service a volunteer rather than a conscription system 
(Sallust, Jugurthine War, 86.1-4; Erdkamp 2006, 187). The result was a mixed national 
corps, all bracketed as ‘Roman’, but who may not have been raised with the same pervading 
military interest as the supposed ‘citizens militia’. 
 How, then, were these heterogenous individuals ‘made productive’ as a unit? Whereas 
Woodward (2004, 119; Sheers 2014, 24-7) emphasises the role of the (predominantly rural) 
‘training ground’ in the forging of military identities, Republican soldiers did not undergo 
extensive training, in either a rural or an urban setting, that might rival military academies 
today (Goldsworthy 1998, 195; see also Phang 2008, 80, on climate and body types in ancient 
warfare). Rather, it was conduct on campaign that made a soldier, and this facet makes 
Roman military practice particularly pertinent to an argument which concerns the reflexive 
territorialising effect of military mobilisation.  
Despite the sizeable overlap between the roles of citizen and soldier so readily 
purported in the scholarship, it was only in the Roman army’s assembling as a mobilised 
force outside the city walls that their territorialising power was activated and validated.21 The 
duty of the Roman armed forces was to ensure the continuing growth and defence of the 
territory overcoded as ager Romanus, at the fringes of the state. ‘Living in cities was though 
to ruin soldiers’ (Phang 2008, 81; Tacitus, Histories, 1.53). As the army laid down roads 
leading back to Rome, each soldier demonstrated a performative Romanness which did not 
depend on whether the recruit had entered military service as Roman-born, but which 
indicates instead that the very mobilisation through which conquered territory was de- and 
reterritorialised as Romanus, at the same time de- and reterritorialised the soldiers’ bodies and 
subjectivity with a similarly nationalistic outcome. 
To a certain extent, nationality was deemed to be as much performative as 
geographical in ancient Rome.22 In Cassius Dio’s Roman History, the third century AD 
historian conceives of a speech from 58 BC, again during Caesar’s campaigns against the 
Gallic tribes, whereby the general explains to his army why, as Romans, they are of a higher 
calibre than their Helvetii opponents. Dio’s Caesar claims of the Helvetii (38.45.4, translated 




…they would not prove superior to us in any way. For, to omit other considerations 
— our numbers, our age, our experience, our deeds — who does not know that we 
have armour over all our body alike, whereas they are for the most part unprotected, 
and that we employ both reason and organization, whereas they are unorganized and 
rush at everything impulsively? 
 
Despite the disputability of this speech as retrospective, the sentiment is significant for many 
reasons: primarily, because it exemplifies the Roman propagandist attitude to any barbarian 
race, as uncivilised and lacking discipline. It could be argued that it was the simple legal 
nomenclature of being ‘Roman’ and not ‘barbarian Other’ which made Caesar’s soldiers (for 
Dio, at least) superior to the Helvetii tribe. The ‘othering’ of enemy forces, discussed as much 
in modern as ancient military writing (Partis-Jennings 2017; Higate 2003, 118; Rembold and 
Carrier 2011, 363; Tacitus, Germanicus, 30), furthermore contributes to the clear definition 
of boundaries in cultural space (Mehta 2006, 205). Yet, in the passage above, it is interesting 
to note that the features listed do not include official ethnicity or Roman citizenship, yet, they 
are corporeal in theme. For one thing, their bodies are technologically advanced by armour, 
which overcodes their ‘original’ physiology with Roman craftsmanship.23 Yet, Dio specifies 
that what really made the difference were the combatants’ ‘experience’ and ‘deeds’, in other 
words, their mobile bodies. Similar sentiments permeate Roman historiographic and poetic 
texts concerning the cultural, performative differences between Rome and her enemies 
(Polybius, 10; Tacitus, Annals, 1.67-8, 13.39; Ammianus Marcellinus, Roman History, 31.7; 
see Phang 2008, 37ff.).   
Military mobilisation therefore transformed men not only from citizens to soldiers, 
but to specifically Roman soldiers. By reterritorialising land as Roman, they assumed Roman 
identity through appropriate militarised behaviours, as Phang (2008, 79) describes:  
 
Even ethnicity, an essential and objective trait in conventional modern culture, was 
constructed by discipline. Strict training, work, and social control produced ‘Roman’ 
soldiers regardless of their original ethnicity and social level. However, authors 
depicted poorly trained and disorderly soldiers as ‘barbarian’. When the soldiers were 
well trained and kept in good order, any non-Roman ethnic identity disappeared and 
they were regarded as Roman soldiers. 
 
Therefore, as expressed by Dio’s Caesar, it was the soldier’s conduct which determined how 
Roman he was, making his former subjectivity and nationality perhaps irrelevant or, at least, 
overwritten. ‘Like the auxilia’, writes Ramsay MacMullen (1984, 445-6), ‘the legions lost 
their ethnic traits’ in the eyes of their generals, through their participation in the behavioural 
codes of the Roman military space.  
 
The Military Step 
‘As condensed sites of national ideals and nationalist violence,’ writes Zoë Wool (2013, 140), 
‘militaries are fields that generate both prestige and danger and are the source of powerful, 
but also ambivalent, identities, social forms, and cultural capital.’ The ‘cultural capital’ in 
Wool’s statement evokes the idea of ‘making’ Roman identity, sourced in the campus 
Martius (the military field) and the ager Romanus, at large. The soldiers’ participation in the 
production of these fields (territories) reflexively produced an appropriate soldierly habitus, 
‘deportment’, a term rooted in Roman military dogma (Vegetius, 1.11-27, 2.19-25; Seneca, 
On Anger, 1.9; Phang 2008, 100; McDonnell 2006, 71), but which can be framed by 
postmodern connotations of the manufacturing of social and cultural status (Bourdieu 2013). 
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In this sense, Roman military praxes can be read as mechanistically deterritorialising recruits 
of their ‘original ethnicity and social level’ on many overlapping strata, reterritorialising them 
as Roman military.  
 Attitudes latent in Roman sources, such as the ‘organisation’ of the legions mentioned 
in Caesar’s speech, and the ‘strict training, work and social control’ in Phang’s description, 
attest to the making of this habitus through disciplina, the famed ‘discipline’ of the Roman 
army. It is unsurprising that, in Discipline and Punish, the figure of the soldier is central to 
Foucault’s considerable discussion of social control: for Foucault, the soldierly body and its 
movement archetypally conveys the manipulation of human life by the ruling state. Foucault 
potently describes the soldier as ‘above all a fragment of a mobile space, before he is courage 
or honour […] The body is constituted as part of a multi-segmentary machine’ (1991, 164, 
translated by Lane).24 These same ideas are readily appropriated in military criticism, as in 
MacLeish (2012, 55): ‘The military body […] represents the transformation of men and 
women into tools. It is a body instrumentalised via discipline and control.’ The Roman 
literary canon reveals that this conceptualisation of the soldierly body as a component part, 
which must function properly in order for the territorialising machine to work, is not confined 
to recent discourse. Comparative analysis between ancient and modern military theory and 
practice highlights how the ‘instrumentalisation’, described by Foucault, actually occurs in 
military spaces.   
 How precisely was national (and personal) identity in the Roman army ‘constructed 
by discipline’, as Phang suggests? The historian, Vegetius, produced in the fourth century AD 
the most comprehensive extant text concerned with the history and practical application of 
Roman military praxes. Although written well after the fall of the Republic, his Epitome of 
Military Science drew on traditions and teachings throughout Roman history to provide a 
manual for ‘the Roman army at its best’ (Goldsworthy 1998b, 9). Vegetius opens with the 
advice: ‘in every battle it is not numbers and untaught bravery so much as skill and 
[discipline] that generally produce the victory’ (1.1, translated by Milner), apparent in 
Caesar’s commentaries (Civil War 1.21, 3.72).  
With this perspective, emphasis is on the action of the individual soldier, necessarily 
before the machine as a whole. Vegetius’ instruction is redolent of Foucault (1991, translated 
by Lane, 164): ‘Discipline is no longer simply an art of distributing bodies, but of composing 
forces in order to obtain an efficient machine.’ The strict regimentation of the Roman 
soldier’s movements is even discernible at the level of Latin linguistics, as Vegetius explains 
(2.1, translated by Milner): ‘The army received its name from the actual fact and action of 
exercise, so it was never permitted to forget what it was called.’ Vegetius refers to the word, 
exercitus: originally connoting ‘an abstract meaning “training”’ (Plautus’ The Fisherman’s 
Rope, 21.7), it came to imply ‘a concrete and specialised sense of a “body of men trained to 
arms, army”’ (Buck 1919, 11-12). By using exercitus as a designating synonym, as well as a 
daily exercise, Roman soldiers were perpetually reminded of the importance of their 
individual movement in maintaining the work of the collective.25  
Exercitus is not the only term associated with the Roman army which implies the 
importance of somatic comportment and preparation (Coker 2002, 39). For, ‘the chief 
function of the disciplinary power is to “train”, rather than to select or to levy’ (Foucault 
1991, translated by Lane, 170). Whether Roman or ‘barbarian’, the body had to be 
overcoded, reterritorialised, from citizen to soldier, from head to toe. Instead of donning the 
weighty toga (a word associated with peace, see Cicero, On Oratory 3.42), soldiers became 
synonymous with their caligae, ‘marching boots’, another Roman nickname for legionaries 
(caligati, see Phang 2008, 17; Pliny, Natural Histories, 7) echoing modern slang, ‘boot’, for 
an inexperienced soldier. The Romans’ marching in these boots reterritorialised their bodies 
as well as the ground they covered, making the military step more than just a means of 
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transporting the army from one location to another, but key to the construction of military 
territory, overall.26    
Despite there being no official military training institutions in ancient Rome, it would 
nevertheless be fair to state that daily routines functioned superlatively to institutionalise the 
habits (and habitus) of the deployed men (Goldsworthy 2013, 82-93; Potter 2006, 81). 
‘Soldiers’ training,’ writes Phang (2008, 39; see also Watson 1983, 57), ‘was ideally ongoing 
and lasted as long as they served in the army.’ In this way, the continued operation of 
exercitus maintained the recruit’s status as Roman and his legitimised participation in the 
army, just as codes of behaviour render terrain territory. After an initial period of ‘basic’ 
weapons handling, skill and discipline was primarily cultivated on the march, emphasising 
the full and immediate geographical immersion into the military career. Crucial to this 
preliminary instruction was the ambulatura, or ‘military step’, as Vegetius (1.9, translated by 
Milner) instructs:  
 
So, at the very start of the training, recruits should be taught the military step. For 
nothing should be maintained more on the march or in battle, than that all soldiers 
should keep ranks as they move. The only way that this can be done is by learning 
through constant training to manoeuvre quickly and evenly. For a divided and 
disordered army experiences danger from the enemy which is always most serious. 
 
The ‘military step’ prompts a rethink of what is meant, in general, by the ‘mobilisation’ of the 
army. It is clear from Vegetius’ description that its purpose is to correctly arrange the moving 
soldiers, as a vital exercise in uniformity. It could even be abstracted that the ‘danger from 
the enemy’ described here does not merely refer to opponent attack, but to the loss of Roman 
identity only granted to well-functioning soldiers who ‘keep ranks’. As such, the correct pace 
was necessarily a quotidian practice: ‘at the military step twenty miles should be covered in 
five hours’, while ‘at the full step, which is faster, twenty-four miles should be covered in the 
same time’ (Vegetius 1.9, translated by Milner). The same ‘military step’ features in 
Polybius’ (10.20, translated by Shuckburgh; see also Livy 29.22.1-3) detailed account of 
Scipio Africanus’ training regime during the campaigns against Hannibal, in Spain (210-6 
BC): a march ‘at the double for thirty stades, in their armour’, a ‘stade’ being equal to a 
stadium lap (approximately four Roman miles).  
Crucially, through these en masse routines, such as the ambulatura, armatura 
(weapons handling) and exercitationes (marches), the army learnt to move together (Vegetius 
1.13ff.). This movement generated a uniform muscular memory worthy of the synecdochic 
Latin word, miles, which translates into English as both ‘soldier’ and ‘army’. ‘The 
relationship to space of a “subject” who is a member of a group or society,’ writes Lefebvre 
(2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 40), ‘implies his relationship to his own body and vice 
versa.’ The functioning of the soldier’s body and, importantly, his self-perception were 
reciprocally determined by his activity as a ‘member’ of the Roman army, whether on the 
march, in the camp, or in the mêlée. This uniformity was also made flesh tactically in combat, 
in formations such as the famous testudo, which drew the legionaries together into one body 
of shields and swords (Dio, 69.29-30).   
 According to Vegetius (1.9), young recruits must carry out their drills twice a day, 
veterans once, in order that muscle memory prevails even at the most difficult and 
threatening moments (1.26). The practice of the ambulatura in the military space replaced the 
daily activities of the citizen, who had the right to attempt to preserve his own life if 
threatened, with a deeply ingrained negation of just that impulse (see Chrissanthos 2007, 
218). Any refusal to uphold the rigid structure of the military machine would likely result in 
the punishment of fustuarium (‘beating to death’, see Polybius, 6.37; Ward 2017, 304), 
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exacted for disobedience, carelessness and desertion – a punishment which makes brutally 
clear the soldiers’ bodily rights versus those of the (elite) citizen (Alston 2010, 208-9). The 
fustuarium was enacted by the transgressor’s comrades (Riess 2017, 304), to accentuate the 
collective impact of contravention. Polybius (6.38, translated by Shuckburgh) reports that, for 
the most part, fear of this punishment seems to have been effective in maintaining discipline: 
‘Consequently, it sometimes happens that men confront certain death at their stations’, while 
others would ‘throw themselves upon their foe’ rather than suffer a disgraceful death.  
 It could be argued that such strict adherence to severe community codes merely 
reflected the ‘blind devotion to one’s native land’ (Nicolet 1980, 90, translated by Falla) 
supposedly characteristic of the Roman citizen body, in general. Yet, this normalising reading 
overlooks the way that soldiers were subject to corporal punishment, whereas citizens were 
not (Richlin 2005, 195-6), ‘a disciplined un-freedom’ familiar to modern military critics, ‘and 
empowered to forms of violence often completely contrary to the values of the civilian 
society they come from and defend’ (MacLeish 2015, 15). As is still the case today, citizen 
law applied only secondarily in the military space: ‘in the field (militiae) the consuls in 
command of armies reverted to the unlimited imperium [power] of the kings’ (Brand 1986, 
66; see Cicero, On Laws, 3.3). Again, Roman practices, such as the fustuarium, throw harsh 
light on the ramifications of consigning absolute authority to a commander. The more 
immanently violent customs and culture of Roman daily life reveal the extent of the soldier’s 
‘un-freedom’ in brutal ways: those who fled from battle were crucified or fed to wild beasts, 
‘penalties reserved normally for criminals from the lowest sections of society, and not 
inflicted on citizens’ (Goldsworthy 2013, 101).27   
The displacement of civilian for military laws in militarised spaces likewise changed 
the moral and sociological perspectives on these codes, the most pertinent being the 
professionalisation of  murder (see Scarry 1985, 121-2; Theweleit 2006, 75-6). Despite the 
centrality of war in Roman culture, the murder of humans was still criminal and hardly 
habitual. Therefore, ‘Roman military training sought to overcome the natural fear of cold 
steel and inhibition toward killing at close range’ (Phang 2008, 42). Phang cites Lt. Col. Dave 
Grossman’s On Killing, in which is described the ‘powerful, innate human resistance to 
killing one’s own species and the psychological mechanisms which have been developed by 
armies over the centuries to overcome that resistance’ (2009, 4; see also Bourke 1999, 41-6, 
60-9). Roman sources report that commanders, like Caesar (Civil War, 3.85, 92; also 
Vegetius, 3.12; Melchior 2011, 220), were well aware of the psychological, as well as the 
somatic, preparation that was needed for successful warfare. In short, constant practice of 
military movement was specifically designed to render professional soldiers better at killing 
than dying (Coker 2002, 26).  
 A refined impetus for violence had to be kept in check, as Phang (2008, 21) points 
out: ‘disciplina militaris [military discipline] socialised soldiers and rising officers and thus 
forestalled mutiny, let alone social revolution.’ In Lucan’s Civil War, he imagines that the 
mutinies against Caesar (nine out of ten legions mutinied during these campaigns; 
Chrissanthos 2001, 75) occurred because the soldiers had been too long out of battle (Luc. 
5.240-6), and their swords and blood had grown cold (see also Tacitus, Annals, 13.35). In 
parallel, Caesar’s commentaries on the same conflict include an account of how his officers 
contemplated an improvident attack, merely ‘because they believed that when the troops were 
in this sort of mood idleness was dangerous’ (Civil War, 2.30, translated by Gardner). This 
‘sort of mood’ was restlessness in the camp and fear of the enemy, unhelpful emotions which 
the commanding officers reasoned could be eradicated by mobilisation (see Seneca, On 
Anger, 1.11).  
 Roman source material indicates that training and drill on campaign sustained 
discipline and habitus, through the repetition of individual and collective movement. Yet, it 
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seems that beyond the ambulatura the soldiers still had to be kept moving, mobilised, in order 
to maintain a tightly controlled territory (see Theweleit 2006, 154; DeLanda 1991, 113), an 
idea brought to the fore by the Latin synonyms for ‘army’ – ‘a rushing’ and ‘that which is 
driven’. Even in peacetime, menial tasks were invented for unoccupied legionaries, with 
‘little or no practical value, such as the whitewashing of walls or the polishing of buckets’ 
(Watson 1983, 143), as stagnant soldiers were arrogant, ‘quick-tempered and violent’ (Phang 
2008, 48), and difficult to control. These tasks contributed to the Roman soldier’s generally 
hard and unpleasant living conditions (‘The soldier’s story is one of constant work’, 
Chrissanthos 2007, 230-7), affecting difficulties mirrored in reports from the twenty-first 
century barracks (‘the mundane, chronic bodily burdens of doing military work that often do 
not rise to the level of straightforward injury’, MacLeish 2016, 5).  
 Hence, without killing or dying to assuage them, desertion and mutiny were rife in the 
Roman world (Lintott 1999, 7; Chrissanthos 2007, 244), but any examples of insurrection 
make clear the consequences of rebellion against the codes of military territory. Caesar, 
himself, was a notoriously frequent target of insubordination, with a prime example being the 
‘Quirites’ speech, during a mutiny of his Tenth Legion in 47 BC, in Campania (Appian, Civil 
Wars, 2.93; Suetonius, Julius Caesar, 70). Allegedly, Caesar quelled the rebellion by 
addressing the mutineers as Quirites, a term meaning ‘citizens’ and explicitly not ‘soldiers’, 
therefore not members of the military territory and its codes (Livy, 1.32; Lucan, 5.358; Phang 
2008, 90). The legionaries were reportedly so shamed by this antonymic epithet that they 
immediately rescinded, and the ringleaders were executed. Practice across the board dictated 
that those who were not slain following insurgence were given different food rations and 
forced to sleep outside the ramparts (Goldsworthy 2013, 101; Polybius, 6.38-40), as rebellion 
against military disciplina and habitus meant ostracization. There was no ‘space’ for 
disobedience in Roman warfare. 
 Military movement, in all its forms, highlights the peculiarity of how mobilisation 
seems to be vital to maintain a boundaried, stable territory, like Mehta’s description of the 
urban neighbourhood as ‘not a space until it is marked by people’s active participation, their 
movements through and around it’ (2006, 209). Yet, a territory is not solely established by 
one-off actions: in order to really reterritorialise a space, these actions must become habitual, 
as Manuel DeLanda (2010, 14) describes in his work on the perpetuation of communities, 
developed from the philosophy of Deleuze. Like the birdsong, territory, whether geographical 
or human, is overcoded by actions regularly performed as habit and instinct:  
 
Habit itself would constitute the main process of territorialisation, that is, the process 
that gives a subject its defining boundaries and maintains those boundaries through 
time. Habit performs a synthesis of the present and the past in view of a possible 
future.  
 
‘Habit’ is etymologically rooted in the Latin, habitus: the appropriate habitus was necessarily 
demonstrative of the Roman soldier. DeLanda’s description here neatly conveys the 
importance of routine behaviours in relation to territorialisation and, furthermore, identity; we 
can in this sense think of the habit-forming ‘military step’ as a ‘process that gives a subject its 
defining boundaries’. When that subject is the soldier, the ‘boundaries’ are not necessarily 
those between one soldier and another, but potentially between legion and legion, miles and 
Quirites, Roman and barbarian. Once ingrained in the military skeleton, routine military 
praxes become habits producing a habitus, resulting from soldierly ‘institutionalisation’ and, 
as such, they serve to sustain the boundaries, the different territory, of military life (see also 




Rome Away from Rome 
A theme consistent in the ancient and modern sources included in this article is that, in their 
‘national’ service, the army carried Rome with it by extending and preserving the ager 
Romanus and, therefore, Roman civilisation. This re-production Rome is represented 
exemplarily in the daily con- and destruction of the military camp (castrorum metatio), a 
habitual activity designed to occupy the soldiers and maintain discipline (Phang 2008, 67-70; 
Vegetius, 1.21-5). The camp theoretically displaced a portion of Roman territory onto, or 
into, new terrain: ‘It is exactly like a legion entering its own city,’ describes Polybius (6.41, 
translated by Shuckburgh), in his detailed description of the camp layout (6.27-32). The camp 
was constructed in the same shape in every location: a walled square with four closely-
guarded gates (Polybius, 6.31), with allowances made for any amendments necessary 
according to circumstance (such as the addition of a ditch, see Goldsworthy 2013, 88-9; 
Vegetius, 3.8). The Roman military camp could, like Lefebvre’s religious-political 
‘representational’ spaces, be ‘ritually affixable to any place and hence also detachable 
therefrom’ (2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 237). In this way, the practice of 
castrametation not only exemplifies the de- and reterritorialisation of foreign territory into 
‘Roman’ space, but also mimics how city spaces are produced by the interactions and 
activities of their constituents. It was both the buildings and the process of constructing and 
dismantling them which made the camp military, and made its inhabitants Roman soldiers.  
 Every society produces its own space. As Polybius states, the barracks were like the 
legion’s own city – a ‘short-lived, artificial city, built and reshaped almost at will’ (Foucault 
1991, translated by Lane, 171) – and not an exact replica of Rome. It was a space different in 
shape and order, both structurally and politically, distinct from the city of Rome, and the rural 
and urban landscapes surrounding it. Adrian Goldsworthy (2013, 33) claims that, ‘The 
temporary camps constructed by the Roman army symbolised the ordered existence of 
citizens whilst they served in the legions’, but while the camp may have ‘symbolised’ citizen 
territory, it was in effect no such thing: the camp was specifically territory of the nomadic 
military community, with its own codes of belonging. The differences in legal, social and 
psychological codes between soldier and civilian make it worthwhile to re-examine the claim 
that Roman military praxes rendered soldiers and their territory specifically Roman. Soldiers 
were considered by citizens to be almost as ‘barbaric’ as enemy troops (Phang 2008, 287-8), 
a stereotype still encountered today (MacLeish 2016, 6), though to a lesser extent (Brooks 
2016; Williams 2012). Roman civilians complained that the foot-soldiers who returned from 
battle bore strange accents, were ‘most savage to look at, frightening to listen to, and boorish 
to talk with’ (Dio, 75.2.6, translated in MacMullen 1984, 440). Upon closer inspection, those 
extracted cells of Romanness therefore seem rather synthetic and not wholly compatible with 
the national body.  
 In many ways, the expansion of the Roman Republic can be said to typify the concept 
of ‘franchised’ territory (Higate and Henry 2010, 35): the construction in different locations 
of boundaried areas under the same sovereign control. The activity of castrametation, like the 
reterritorialising of earth as battlefield or colonised province, epitomises how territory is 
created by action. Its constant con- and destruction is bound up with its territorial identity – 
like the con- and destruction of the human bodies which constitute the military machine. The 
world of the camp was symbiotic with the soldiers’ movements, hence the Latin word for 
camp, castra, was another synonym for the legion (Lucan, 1.319, 3.211), and Roman legions 
would enlarge their camp to intimidate the enemy (Caesar, Gallic Wars, 5.49.7; Frontinus, 
3.17.6; Phang 2008, 68). ‘A well-trained legion,’ Milner (1996, 50) comments in his 





As Wool (2013, 140) asserts in her discussion of the forging of military identity in the field 
today, ‘Soldiers are made as men within this field not only through discipline and training, 
but also, crucially, through their deeply felt attachments to it and to each other.’ For the 
Roman army, spatial flux was not only fundamental to the ‘continuous production’ of 
military discipline but, furthermore, soldierly identity. In this article, Latin terminology and 
Roman military praxes have been read as revealing how the nomadism of the army was 
paradoxically crucial to its affiliation with the fixed city of Rome, despite the stark 
differences between soldierly and civilian habits and habitus. The brutality of official 
penalties draws attention to the importance weighted on physical action proper to one’s 
relationship to territory. For, ‘The body is the site of the training and capacities that make the 
modern professional soldier competent and effective’ writes MacLeish (2012, 55), wherein 
the word, ‘site’, posits the soldierly body as a territory as well as a technology.  
Indeed, the rapid and violent expansion of the Roman empire was accomplished 
through the reterritorialisation of geographical terrain and, likewise, of bodies and identities. 
Yet, this reterritorialisation did not generate perfectly ‘Roman’ simulacra, rather a synthetic, 
mass-produced military mutation which purported the illusion, and enforced the sovereignty, 
of Romanness. In this sense, territory conquered by the Romans is rightly referred to as 
‘provincial’ or ‘colonised’, still only quasi-Roman even after years of being ‘civilised’ as 
ager Romanus – like the pastoral settlements distorted by an awareness of military presence 
today, ‘even as its role in their lives was utterly routinised, normalised, and hidden from an 
outsider’ (MacLeish 2016, 6).  
 The significant time gap between ancient Rome and today allows for a certain 
unbarred scrutiny of antique practices, some of which seem primitive and brutal to modern 
eyes. However, this article has aimed to show how the theoretical impetus behind many of 
these praxes can be read as continuing to underpin military mobilisation in the twenty-first 
century. The treatment of Roman literature in this study demonstrates how theoretical 
concepts can refresh, and be refreshed, by comparison with varied fields of study. These 
Roman sources, with their parallels in modern military criticism, combine to expose the 
military institution, transhistorically, as especially culpable for overcoding borders and 
bodies: like the habits and customs which ‘construct’ cities, and public and private spaces, 
military activity does the same – but this is a creation of spaces for destruction, a territory of 
violence and its potentiality. Thinking with philosophies of territorialisation reconfigures how 
activity is environment, how bodies are territories, and their actions generate these landscapes 
as much as the ground beneath them. The traces of militarisation do not confine themselves to 
the ground, but also infiltrate the boots marching upon it. ‘Power produces,’ asserts Foucault 
(1991, translated by Lane, 194), ‘it produces reality…’ Military might produces militarised 
territory; it leaves an insignia, and ‘Nothing disappears completely […] In space, what came 
earlier continues to underpin what follows’ (Lefebvre 2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 
229).    
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 Compare Roselaar 2016, 138: ‘The Roman army in the first century CE was responsible for 
a great deal of mobility in the Empire’, given that the army built roads.   
2 On this approach in existing Classical scholarship, see Sabin 2000, 3-4, on first-hand 
accounts of battle: ‘It is obviously perilous to draw comparisons with the much better 
documented infantry clashes of the gunpowder era, since military technology has changed so 
much over the intervening centuries. However, the instincts and psychological pressures 
affecting massed formations of troops in close proximity to similar opposing formations are 
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unlikely to have changed anything like as much over what is an insignificant interval in 
evolutionary terms.’ See also Melchior 2011.  
3 It should be made clear at this point the difference between the commonly cited ‘military 
machine’, in the context of military practice, and the ‘war machine’ specific to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy (2013, translated by Massumi; see also DeLanda 2010, 75). The latter 
is a complex political metaphor ‘which does not necessarily have war as its object’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2013, translated by Massumi, 484), and although in many ways it is pertinent to 
this discussion, Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘war machine’ is not what is being referred to, here.    
4 Foucault is here arguing for a constitutional departure, in the eighteenth century, from the 
‘Roman’ imperial system of government.   
5 Frontinus’ Strategemata, from the first century AD, survives only in fragments. It is 
mentioned in Aelian’s Tactics, a Greek work on the Hellenic military (second century AD), 
along with a much earlier text by Aeneas Tacticus on siege operations (fourth century BC).   
6 The exception is the discovery of three-hundred documents at Vindolanda, a military camp 
at Hadrian’s wall, dated to the turn of the second century AD. These letters and military 
records, albeit fragmented, give a unique insight into daily life in the Roman camp (see 
Bowman 1994).  
7 See also McCormack 2017, on the ‘territorialising practices’ of U.S. security strategies; 
Higate and Henry 2010, 44; Rech, et al., 2015, 50-1, on the relation between military activity 
and landscapes: ‘“Military landscapes” thus allow us to locate, place, and situate militaries 
and their activities, and to inquire as to the more-often-than-not deleterious effects of 
(sometimes anachronistic) military presences in landscapes.’ Consider Pomeroy 2003, 361: 
‘Geography often turns out to be a state of mind rather than a collection of empirically 
verifiable facts.’  
8 Consider also Trigg 2017, on the embodiment of place and non-place. With reference to 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, he writes: ‘spatiality is not a neutral 
backdrop, but an active ﬁeld of force, deﬁned by a global meaning’ (132).  
9 See Polybius, Histories 1.1.5. As such, the Mediterranean therefore became what Erica 
Bexley might determine a ‘Romanocentric’ universe, a term she uses antithetically in her 
discussion of the political geography of Lucan’s Civil War (2009, 460).  
10 This meaning of land ownership correlates with the disparity between a definitive ‘nation 
state’ and an aggregate ‘territory’. Consider this description of the relatively new state of 
Afghanistan in the nineteenth century, ‘not a country but a territory. Its borders were a matter 
of opinion’ (Ansary 2012, 85). Moreover, the Roman state did not always set out to annex 
every patch of land over which they marched unhindered, but this practice depended on 
potential financial and defensive gains (see, for example, Livy, 36.17.13-16). 
11 See Cicero’s On the Republic 3.35-7, translated by Sage: ‘Our people have gained 
dominion over the world by defending their allies [...] And do we not see that dominion has 
been given to everything that is best for the greatest advantage of the weak? For what other 
reason does god rule men or the soul control the body, or rationality dominate desire, anger, 
and the other defective parts of the mind?’ See also Mattern 2009, 127: ‘[the Romans] 
perceived foreign policy as a zero-sum game of honour in which one’s perceived ability to 
inflict violence was the essential, irreducible item on which everything depended.’ 
12 Carthage, like Numidia and the north east coast of Africa, became Roman provinces, 
following the conclusion of the Punic wars in the mid-second century BC (Sage 2008, 270). 
However, as Kiernan writes (2004, 28), ‘Despite the amazing regularity with which Rome 
went to war in this era, the policy to destroy Carthage was unusual. It was both decided in 
advance and pursued after the city’s surrender.’  
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13 Polybius was an Achaean, taken hostage by Roman invaders in 168 BC (Beard 2015, 186-
7), then accepted into Roman society as a close friend of the general, Scipio Aemilianus. He 
was physically present at the fall of Carthage in 146 BC, a harrowing example of Roman 
‘defensive’ might (see Plutarch, Cato the Elder, 26-27, and Sallust, War of Catiline, 10.1-6, 
on the preceding Senatorial debates). 
14 Further examples of Roman de- and reterritorialisation include the siege of Munda in 
Spain, a climactic battle during Julius Caesar’s civil wars (45 BC), where the walls Caesar 
built around the town of Munda were formed of enemy corpses (Caesar, Spanish War, 32; 
Chrissanthos 2007, 239). See also Kiernan 2004, 27; Appian, Roman History, 8.126, on the 
(ultimate) sacking of Carthage in 146 BC, in which at least 150,000 Carthaginians were killed.   
15 See Lovano 2013, 75, on Caesar’s commentaries: ‘Caesar’s feigned or conventional or 
honest respect for the warlike tribes as opposed to the more settled and peaceful tribes hits the 
reader from the start; this is the Roman attitude of the love of war as a virtue, not as a 
necessary evil, a theme that we find equally in the works of Tacitus and Sallust.’ 
16 For instance, the gruesome imagery of Polybius’ account of the Carthaginian wars inspired 
the Civil War’s infamous violence (Phang 2008, 43-4; see also Livy, 31.34.4). 
17 A notorious example of this reterritorialisation of citizen space is the proscriptions of 
Lucius Cornelius Sulla, which transformed the city of Rome into a killing spree. Following a 
civil war victory against Gaius Marius (88-82 BC), Sulla’s paranoia as dictator (82-79 BC) led 
him to eradicate all citizens who might oppose his rule, by posting lists of the condemned in 
the forum, for anyone to dispatch. In so doing, he ‘filled […] all of Italy with bloodshed’ 
(Livy, Perochiae, 88). Severed heads were piled in the forum, as elaborately recounted in 
Lucan (2.169-73), overcoding the space formerly for public gatherings as an exhibition of 
hysteria, with nearly five-thousand victims in a matter of months. ‘Sulla wanted to break all 
records for variations on the theme of killing’ (Henderson 2003, 42), reterritorialising citizens 
as executioners, amplifying the mutative effects of civil conflict.  
18 For discussion of the many facets of ‘globalisation’ (or ‘Romanisation’) in the Roman 
world, see Lutz and Lutz 2015; also Pitts and Versluys, 2015.  
19 The population according to a census taken by Augustus (14 AD), although this figure is 
disputable; see Nicolet 1980, 17. See Phang 2008, 114-15, on military abuse of citizens. 
20 See Phang 2008, 79, on the use of solely Latin and Greek in Roman posts, as the Romans 
were reluctant to learn foreign languages. See Bowman 1994, 61, on the adoption of Roman 
names. 
21 This impacted on the social and political status of the soldier. As remains the case today, 
certain citizen rights were denied or irrelevant to the military. ‘Technically, the citizen under 
arms appears to have had very similar rights to the civilian, but in fact the soldier was subject 
to a whole range of more severe penalties for misconduct, and his right of appeal, therefore 
his libertas [freedom], was limited’ (Alston 2010, 209). See also Brand 1968. For the debate 
concerning twenty-first century soldiers, see the work of Ross McGarry, especially McGarry 
2012.   
22 Relatedly, see Partis-Jennings 2017, on the debate concerning the performative nature of 
masculinity in warfare; also Morris 1995. 
23 ‘Roman’ arms were often copied from enemy troops, or formulated to combat them; see 
Diodorus Siculus, 23.2.1.   
24 See also Lefebvre (2009, translated by Nicholson-Smith, 40): ‘social practice presupposes 
the use of the body: the use of the hands, members and sensory organs, and the gestures of 
work as of activity unrelated to work. This is the realm of the perceived (the practical basis of 
the perception of the outside world, to put it in psychology’s terms).’  
25 The derivation of this word, esercito, is still used for ‘army’ in modern Italian.  
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26 See Elaine Scarry (1985, 118) on theories which posit that ‘the rhythmic movement of 
marching in step with many men or of firing a gun by following a precise series of forty-two 
successive acts performed identically by all participants - the disappearance from the soldier's 
body of the signs of a particular region or country’.  
27 See Melchior 2011, 218: ‘Mortars could not be lobbed into the Green Zone, suicide 
bombers did not walk into the market, and garbage piled on the street did not hide powerful 
explosives. The danger for a Roman soldier was largely circumscribed by his moments on the 
field of battle.’ 
28 Compare Higate and Henry (2010, 34), on modern peace-keeping practices: ‘We are 
habituated into space, may fail to reflect on the staged or performed character of social life 
and are likely to perceive security at the level of the nonconscious, perhaps in an existential 
sense.’  
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